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Summary 
 
This paper considers the empiricist approach to the problem 
of induction and the implications in applied building 
economics.  Induction, or the generalising from small to 
large samples, or generalising from past to the future, is 
shown to be logically indefensible as a legitimate means of 
knowledge acquisition thus bringing into question the whole 
of empirical research as a means of generating knowledge.  
This raises the issue of the distinction between knowledge 
and beliefs and the nature of probabilistic statements, and 
this is examined in the context of building economic 
modelling.  It is concluded that probabilistic statements 
concern degrees of belief and should be tested as such. 
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Introduction 
 
"... the detection of a cost trend does not necessarily 
imply that it will continue in the future.  Indeed it is 
very unwise to extrapolate a cost movement ..." (Ferry & 
Brandon, 1991:119). 
 
"... it may be possible to extrapolate a trend into the 
future.  However, there are very great dangers in 
attempting this" (Ferry & Brandon, 1991:130). 
 
"Most samples are intended or believed to represent the 
population from which they were drawn.  There is no way of 
making certain that this is so ..." (Beeston, 1983:8). 
 
One of the most important tasks of building economists is 
to forecast future events of economic significance.  In 
practice, this is done by a process of extrapolation from 
past events.  Seemingly relevant data are analysed for 
trends, and these trends are assumed to extend into the 
future.  The nature of scientific enquiry is essentially 
just this also.  In this case the trends are taken to be 
governed by 'laws' (ie., the 'laws of nature').  Here the 
'laws' are discovered by scientists by the well tried and 
tested process of rigorous experimentation and replication 
of physical phenomena.  The laws are treated as causally 
based.  The occurrence of one type of event (cause) is 
observed to be followed by the occurrence of another type 
of event (effect).  When event, C, is invariably followed 
by event, E, it is intuitively obvious that C causes E1. 
                     
    1the relationship connecting the two events is termed a functional relationship. ie., E is a function of C, 
 
Where the C is not invariably followed by E, but only 99% 
of the time, it is still relatively easy to imply cause and 
effect, the 1% residual usually being attributed to some 
type of experimental error.  In this case the research 
chemist would assume the 1 in 100 'bad' result to be due to 
the use of impure chemicals.  A similar approach tends to 
be taken in physics, where the classical assumption is that 
the lack of an absolute vacuum is responsible. 
 
Where C is followed by E only 90% of the time, attributing 
cause and effect becomes rather less intuitive.  At 50%, it 
is assumed that the research has failed and another line of 
investigation is started off on a different tack. 
 
In social sciences research, and building economics is a 
social science, 100% relationships never occur.  Many never 
even approach this desirable state.  Thus, all social 
science research leads to failure by physical sciences 
standards. 
 
What is to be made of this?  Is social science, and 
therefore by implication, building economics research, a 
waste of time?  Are we lacking in standards?  What are our 
standards?  What should our standards be? 
 
The obvious argument is that a relationship, even if it 
holds only 50.001% of the time, is still an improvement on 
mere chance, which can only be expected to hold exactly 50% 
of the time.  On this basis it is better to do something 
than nothing at all.  But this ignores opportunity cost.  
The other side of the equation is that all research entails 
a cost and if the costs exceed the benefits to the extent 
that pursuing another activity has a better cost-benefit 
outcome, then it makes economic sense to pursue that other 
activity instead.  There are two problems even with this 
though.  The first is that the costs and benefits cannot 
usually be estimated very accurately.  Thus we do not know 
the costs of the research until we have done it, neither do 
we know the of the existence of the miserably weak 
relationships until we have done the research.  The second 
problem, and which actually subsumes the first, concerns 
the extent to which the estimated or even the true 
relationships observed can be assumed to continue into the 
future.  This is the classical 'problem of induction' and 
to which this paper is aimed at addressing. 
 
In the first part of this paper, the historical foundations 
of the problem of induction are examined via the British 
Empiricists school of philosophy.  This is of necessity a 
fairly lengthy treatment in view of the general lack of 
awareness of the subject area among construction management 
researchers, and the exmples given are of a none technical 
nature to keep the flavour of the original ideas of the 
philosophers involved.  In the second part, the 
implications for social sciences are considered in general 
                                                                       
denoted as E=f(C), with the implication that C 'causes' E. 
and building economics in particular. 
 
It might be argued that this paper presents an overly 
dogmatic attitude to existing systems and that a more 
sympathetic appraisal of existing techniques is needed.  
This may well be the case and it is to be hoped that such a 
view may be presented in some future paper on the subject. 
 Meanwhile, however, the combined limitations of my 
knowledge and writing space have dictated events and what 
you see before you is the best I can muster thus far.  The 
hope is that the reader will approach the paper with 
patience and trust.  The intention is certainly not to be 
controversial nor even prescriptive.  Instead, the aim is 
to lay the groundwork for future discussion on the subject 
by opening up a body of knowledge that is relevant to the 
foundations of building economics. 
 
 
Historical perspective2 
 
The problem of induction can be appreciated through a 
philosophical contrast between two kinds of argument, 
deductive and inductive.  In the case of a valid deductive 
argument, the conclusion logically follows from its premise 
(eg., from the premises 'all As are B' and 'this is an A', 
the conclusion 'this is a B' follows logically).  So if the 
premises are true, then the conclusion must be true and it 
would be self-contradictory to assert the premises and deny 
the conclusion3. 
 
In the case of an inductive argument, the conclusion does 
not logically follow from the premises (eg., from premises 
'some As are B' and 'this is an A', the logical conclusion 
'this is a B' does not follow because it would not be self 
contradictory to claim that every A experienced so far is a 
B but that the next A, or any future A, is not a B.  
However, although every inductive argument is invalid as a 
putative deductive argument, we feel that in the inductive 
case the premises in some sense make it rational to accept 
the conclusion.  Defining this sense is the problem of 
induction.  The problem is sometimes called the 
'justification of induction' because it requires us to 
justify the inference that 'all As are Bs' or 'this A is a 
B' from 'some As are Bs' where this does not follow 
logically. 
 
One of the first people to study this problem in depth was 
the Scot David Hulme (1711-66).  Hulme provides us with 
this example: 
 
 The bread which I formerly eat, nourished me; that is 
a body of such sensible qualities was, at that time, endued 
with such secret powers: but does it follow, that other 
bread must also nourish me at another time, and that like 
sensible qualities must always be attended with like secret 
powers?  The consequence seems nowise necessary (Selby-
Bigge and Nidditch, 1975, sect iv, para 29). 
 
Thus it does not necessarily follow from the fact that past 
bread was nutritious that present or future bread will be. 
 The conjunction of the claims that past bread was 
nutritious and present or future bread is or will not be 
nutritious is not a necessary truth.  Nevertheless, as 
Hulme emphasises, we do habitually depend upon our past 
experience as a guide to the information about the present 
and future. 
 
                     
    2Most of this section drawn freely from Priest's (1990) The British Empiricists: Hobbs to Ayer which 
makes often highly technical and specialised philosophical work accessible to the lay reader. 
 
 
    3that any assertion other than the truth is self-contradictory is the basis of the classical definition of a 
deductive argument 
John Stuart Mill (1806-73) defined induction as " ... that 
operation of the mind by which we infer that what we know 
in a particular case or cases, will be true in all cases 
which resemble the former in certain assignable respects" 
(Mill, 1897, vol 1, p 333).  Mill therefore defines 
induction psychologically, as 'an operation of the mind', 
but since the work of Frege and Russell it is customary to 
separate logic from psychology.  An important reason for 
this is any argument is either valid or invalid 
irrespective of any states of mind, in particular any 
beliefs about that argument's validity or invalidity.  Mill 
construes the problem of induction as epistemological 
rather than as a problem in the philosophy of logic.  He 
thinks of it as a question of how we can know that what 
holds true in a restricted number of cases holds true in 
all cases.  Thus the problem might be better construed as 
whether the truth of the premises of an inductive argument 
in any sense make true, or make probably true, the 
conclusion.  In Mill's words induction " ... proceeds from 
the known to the unknown" (Mill, 1897, vol 1, p 333). 
 
Mill maintains that an appeal to the uniformity of nature 
is powerless to solve the problem of induction because it 
is itself an inductive principle.  Although " that the 
course of nature is uniform, is the fundamental principle, 
or general axiom of induction" (Mill, 1897, vol 1, p 355), 
such a law could only be established by induction, and so 
produces a circularity in any putative justification of 
induction employing it as a premise. 
 
Indeed it is not the case that nature is wholly uniform, 
and it is not the case that inductive generalisations hold 
true always and everywhere.  The unknown does not always 
resemble the known and the future does not always resemble 
the past.  However, even this distinction between where 
regularities obtain and where they break down rests on 
induction: it again being impossible to observe all 
possible cases of which a generalisation is putatively 
true. 
 
Bertram Russell (1872-1970) is careful to separate the 
logical and psychological aspects of induction.  That 
regularity of phenomena is more than mere expectation is 
illustrated in his example, " the man who has fed the 
chicken every day throughout its life at last wrings its 
neck instead, showing that more refined views as to the 
uniformity of nature would have been useful to the 
chicken!" (Russell, 1942:58). 
 
Russell concludes that all 'solutions' to the problem of 
induction must be in the form of a presupposed induction, 
and so begs the question.  Any appeal to the uniformity of 
nature is circular, because the principle that nature is 
uniform is the thesis that nature operates in accordance 
with exceptionless natural laws.  This may only be 
established inductionally, if at all.  Any argument that we 
know the future will resemble the past because past futures 
have resembled the past is equally inductive, because only 
induction warrants the belief that future futures will 
resemble the past. 
 
Russell's contribution is to accept that we cannot 
logically derive 'all As are B' from 'some As are B' and 
suggests that the probability of all As being B, or the 
next A being B is all we should seek.  Russell's principle 
of induction is therefore: the greater the number of cases 
of A being B, the greater the probability of all As being 
B, and the greater the number of cases of A being B the 
greater the probability of the next A being B.  It is 
always more probable that the next A will be a B (other 
things being equal) than that all As are B, because 
although 'all As are B' makes 'the next A is B' true, 'the 
next A is B' does not make 'all As are B' true. 
 
It is claimed that Russell's probabilistic solution of 
induction is not refuted if, for a particular A, 'A is not 
B' is true.  Suppose we have seen only white swans, in a 
large and increasing population of swans.  Suppose however 
(as is the case) there is also a population of black swans. 
 We were none the less rational in supposing all swans to 
be white even though that supposition was false.  From the 
fact that an event is unlikely to occur it does not 
logically follow that it will not occur, and conversely if 
an event is likely to occur, it does not logically follow 
that it will occur (208-10). 
 
A J Ayer (1910-1992) cutely considers the problem of 
induction to be a 'pseudo-problem' because there is no 
possible method of solving it.  No amount of empirical 
observation or inspection of meanings will resolve the 
putative sceptical issue, so "it is a fictitious problem, 
since all genuine problems are at least capable of being 
solved" (Ayer, 1976:67).  It follows for Ayer therefore 
that the problem of induction is not a problem for the 
logic of the natural sciences because induction is not a 
problem at all! 
 
If we assume the problem is genuine, according to Ayer, 
there are two and only two, ways of trying to solve it.  A 
 claim about the future may be putatively derived from some 
formal a priori claim or from some a posteriori, empirical 
claim, but neither of these is satisfactory.  Ayer's view 
is that all a priori propositions are tautologies, but no 
empirical claim may be derived from a tautology, so no 
claim about the future may be derived from any a priori 
proposition.  Nor on the other hand may any claim about the 
future be derived from empirical propositions about the 
past on pain of circularity, because then "one simply 
assumes what one is setting out to prove" (Ayer, 1976:66). 
 Thus it follows from Ayer's premises that "there is no 
possible way of solving the problem of induction" (Ayer, 
1976:67).  Both the a priori and a posteriori attempts at 
solution have failed, but as any meaningful statement is 
either a priori or a posteriori there remains no meaningful 
solution to the problem. 
 
 
The implications of the problem of induction on the 
existence of knowledge 
 
The problem of induction is clearly crucial not only to 
scientific method but also to commonsense.  The natural 
laws of the sciences are universal inductive 
generalisations of the form 'all As are Bs'.  They ascribe 
properties to objects over the whole of space and time, yet 
any scientist has only sampled some finite portion of the 
universe and therefore his or her investigations warrant 
the claim that 'some As are Bs' or 'all the observed so far 
are Bs'.  There is a logical gap between the conclusions 
justified by the observation and the wide generalisations 
based on these conclusions. 
 
Induction, on the other hand, is essential to the 
intelligibility of the world of everyday life.  We assume 
that, as Hulme says, our food will nourish us and not 
poison us.  We assume that when we open the door to leave 
the room we will step on to a floor and not into total 
emptiness, that when we stand up we will be able to walk, 
that we are not about to go blind or deaf, that when we 
talk to the cat it will not talk back, that the objects 
about us will stay on the earth and not fly into the air - 
and so on for thousands and thousands of other beliefs.  If 
it were not for induction our knowledge would be confined 
at the most to the mere solipsism of the present moment, 
more likely even the intelligibility of the present moment 
depends on induction. 
 
Historians give us knowledge of the past based on the 
present evidence, but it does not follow that 'past As were 
Bs' from present 'As are Bs' any more than it follows that 
'future As are Bs'.  The problem of induction opens a gulf 
in the midst of all our knowledge of the universe.  If 
induction cannot be justified, then none of our knowledge 
can be justified (157-9). 
 
Induction is presupposed by our science and our 
commonsense.  It is also essential to empiricist 
philosophy, but, it seems, cannot, be established 
empirically.  The problem of induction cannot be solved: 
induction is indispensable but unjustifiable. 
 
The twentieth century philosophical view is that each of us 
is directly acquainted only with our sense data and perhaps 
ourselves.  It follows that knowledge of anything else - 
the past, the future, other people, indeed anything outside 
our immediate private experience - must be by other means. 
 Most of our knowledge depends upon induction, on inductive 
inference from facts about our immediate experience to 
other facts.  This means that the problem of justification 
of induction is not only a problem in the philosophy of 
science; it is central to the possibility of nearly all our 
knowledge (181-3). 
 
Ayer believes that we should have confidence in induction 
as a practical principle and that this is all that is 
necessary for the conduct of science.  It does not 
deductively follow from the past explanatory success of 
science that science will continue to be successful in the 
future, but it is wrong to hold this as an objection to 
scientific method because "it is a mistake to demand a 
guarantee where it is logically impossible to obtain one" 
(Ayer, 1976:67). 
 
Nor does it follow from the fact that the problem of 
induction cannot be solved that it is irrational to suppose 
that the future will resemble the past.  It is rational to 
believe scientific predictions because part of what it is 
to be rational is to be guided by the past.  Scientific 
method is justified in practice and by experience, not by 
philosophy.  Scientific prediction, for example, is 
justified in so far as scientific predictions turn out to 
be true, and no more than this.  According to Ayer, it is 
not the role of philosophy to construct a priori 
justifications of scientific method but to remove from its 
path pseudo-problems of which the problem of induction is 
one (240-1). 
 
 
Induction and building economics 
 
What are the implications of the problem of induction for 
building economics?  As a starting point it has to be 
accepted from the above that the problem of induction is 
epistemologically devastating.  From a common sense point 
of view, this is really an obvious statement.  It is one of 
the reasons for separating 'beliefs' from 'knowledge'.  We 
may believe that building prices will be 10% more next year 
than this year, but we cannot know with certainty that this 
will be the case.  Neither can we deduce with certainty 
that from a sample of say 50 offices projects that all the 
world's offices projects will exhibit the same underlying 
economic characteristics.  Although both these examples are 
essentially the same problem - both involve the 
extrapolation from what is known about our database to what 
might be the case for similar data not included in our data 
base - it is convenient to divide this into two issues.  
Firstly, the uncertainties about the future and secondly 
the uncertainties about the generalisation from samples to 
populations.  Both these issues are well understood in 
statistical modelling.  In dealing with future events we 
need to consider the ex post errors, and in dealing with 
samples we need to consider ex ante errors or confidence 
intervals.  In these cases, the usual method is to recourse 
to the use of probability statements to quantify the 
amounts of uncertainties involved.  This is the approach 
taken by Russell and to which we will return later in 
considering whether such probability statements are to be 
treated as beliefs or knowledge. 
 
In building economics as practised by people in industry, 
eg., quantity surveyors, the treatment of these issues is 
not so clear.  To the best of my knowledge, the problem of 
induction is not recognised.  The demands of practice 
dictate that a deterministic estimate is given of the 
project price.  From what has been written above, it is 
clear that this is not logically possible.  Perfectly 
deterministic estimates are logically unattainable in a 
rational manner.  This gives rise to two possibilities, (1) 
to try to obtain estimates by irrational means or (2) to 
abandon the search for deterministic estimates.  There has 
not been time or inclination to examine (1) as yet.  
Instead we will look more closely at (2) and consider the 
possibilities for nondeterministic estimates. 
 
There are several possible ways of coping with uncertainty 
in building economics.  These range from, in decreasing 
order of information usage, probabilistic to fuzzy 
modelling.  Thus, in moving away from deterministic 
estimates, probabilistic estimates are least radical 
departure.  Probabilistic approaches however do demand some 
assumptions to be made and it could be that a cavalier 
approach to these assumptions is of no less importance than 
a cavalier approach to the problem of induction.  In this 
paper considerations will be limited to probabilistic 
economics and the extent to which they might provide a way 
around the problem of induction. 
 
 
Probabilistic economics 
 
As mentioned above, Russell has suggested that, in face of 
the insurmountable problem of induction, an alternative is 
to accept the existence of uncertainty and include it in 
the modelling process.  What does this imply? 
 
The first possibility is that by assigning a certain 
probability to an event we may be just shifting the problem 
of induction to a different place.  If for instance we 
assign a probability of .01 (1% chance) to the likelihood 
of the existence of black (or purple striped) swans and it 
turns out that 10% are actually of this colour, then how 
would we describe the 'truth' of the probability 
assignment?  Isn't this just a slight of hand brought about 
by making the dichotomous 'truth' variable into a 
continuous variable of varying degrees of truth by using 
the proxy 'degree of belief in truth'?  And doesn't this 
then raise the issue of how good is the estimate of 
probability and because we don't know the answer to that 
for certain we have to express it as a probability of a 
probability and hence into an infinite regress?  Should we 
talk about 'true' (ie unknown) probability values?  Is 
there such a thing and what does it mean?  Is it something 
to do with sampling problems, ie., the bigger the sample 
the better the estimate of probability?  And is an estimate 
of the proportion of coloured swans in the population just 
as good as the estimate that the next swan will be 
coloured? 
 
Most of these questions are concerned with the meaning of 
probability and Ayer has plenty to say on this subject in a 
memorable paper in Dowie and Lefrere's (1980) "Risk and 
Chance".  The main point of this is to show that 
probability is a human concept rather than any real state 
of nature, and is thus a characteristic of 'belief' rather 
than 'knowledge'.  This is a very important distinction and 
clarifies much of the confusion implicit in the above 
questions.  For example, a frequency distribution that is 
compiled from a set of observations on a sample of events 
is clearly 'knowledge' (ie., factual) about that sample.  
To make the leap forward and claim that this frequency 
distribution represents some larger sample yet to be 
observed is to step out of the factual world in to the 
world of 'beliefs'.  Similarly, to fit a continuous 
probability distribution to this empirically derived 
discrete frequency distribution is also a step into the 
world of beliefs. 
 
On this reasoning, to argue that a probability of 0.01 
represents the likelihood of the existence of black swans 
is somehow connected with the proportion of black swans in 
the world is to argue that our beliefs about the 
composition of the world are somehow connected with the 
real composition of the world.  As has been proved, such an 
argument can only be justified by belief and is therefore 
circular. 
 
So what then has this to do with truth statements?  In what 
respects can a probability of say, 0.01, be considered to 
be 'true'?  It seems to me that, as probabilities exist 
only for beliefs, then a probability of 0.01 is a measure 
of a belief.  On this basis it is possible to conceive the 
existence of a 'true' (but unknown) value of this 
probability and for which the probability of 0.01 is 
'merely' an estimate.  Therefore if one was to ask a sample 
of people for their subjective probability of their being 
purple striped swans, we might well take the average of 
these probability 'estimates' as being a close 
approximation to the 'true' probability of the belief that 
there may be purple striped swans (assuming that all people 
believe to the same degree but each is unable to accurately 
gauge that level of belief). 
 
No doubt none of this is new to the specialists in the 
philosophy of mathematics, but it is certainly new to the 
writer and suggests a solution to a problem that has raised 
its ugly head a few times over the years.  The most recent 
occurrence of this was in the assessment and validation of 
probabilistic estimates of project cost and times.  Using 
systems such as Bennett and Ormerod's (1984) Construction 
Project Simulator, it is possible to generate a probability 
distribution of project cost and duration.  The question is 
how to test the generated distribution for accuracy.  
Clearly, with a system that simply generates point 
estimates, the accuracy can be measured as the difference 
or ratio between the forecasted and actual cost or 
duration.  With a probability distribution, it is difficult 
to see how this may be done.  For an actual project cost to 
lie somewhere within the limits of a probability 
distribution is not very informative, especially where 
asymptotic distributions such as the normal or log-normal 
distributions are involved.  Performing this analysis over 
a series of projects provides more information but still 
does not enable us to make any clear judgements between 
competing systems.  If the above argument is correct and 
the probability distribution is only a measure of belief, 
then the lack of a logical relationship between beliefs and 
knowledge implies that the real-world status of the 
probability distributions generated by such systems is 
empirically untestable.  In other words, the probability 
distribution is not a measure of the likelihood of the 
bands into which actual costs might fall, but is simply a 
measure of the uncertainty of belief concerning the value 
of the actual cost. 
 
The fact that models of the uncertainty of a belief are 
intrinsically different from the uncertainty of an event 
also has implications in other belief models such as expert 
or 'knowledge' based systems.  Most of these systems 
comprise belief models with the uncertainties expressed as 
uncertainties in beliefs.  Again, testing competing systems 
of this kind is logically limited to matching the model 
against the beliefs it purports to model.  To test the 
models against actual events is not a test of the model at 
all but a test of the modelled beliefs.  This observation 
leads to the inevitable conclusion that modelling beliefs 
is largely a fruitless exercise in the pursuit of knowledge 
as mismatches between the model and actuality are caused by 
an inextricable mixture of belief and modelling errors. 
 
 
Conclusions 
 
The original intention of writing this paper was to 
introduce the empiricist approach to induction in the 
context of building economics in order to examine the 
status of extrapolation from small to large and past to 
future.  The problem of induction has been thoroughly 
worked over by all the major forces in the field of 
philosophy over several centuries of thought and the fact 
that induction is logically indefensible (though of 
practical value) was established by empiricist philosophers 
some time ago.  As such the subject is somewhat sterile 
even though it brings into question the whole of empirical 
research as a knowledge generating activity!  That there is 
no logical basis for believing in the existance of 'laws' 
of nature or any form of behaviour is a salutory finding 
and raises important questions concerning the status of so 
the called 'deterministic' and 'rational' approaches so 
ingrained in current research.  Considering the length of 
time since this was first established, it is indeed 
remarkable that so few people criticise the zeitgeist. 
 
A secondary issue that is of great interest in building 
economics is the implications on the relationships between 
probability, knowledge and beliefs arising from Russell's 
'solution'.  From the analysis in this paper it is shown 
that probability can only be a measure of the degree of 
belief concerning some matter, rather than the degree of 
knowledge concerning that matter.  This is an important 
result as it specifically denies the possibility of a 
factual, or factually meaningful, basis to our models and 
has an important bearing on the way we view, and construct 
tests on, probabilistic models and 'knowledge' based 
systems. 
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